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We study a model of network formation and start-up financing with endogenous 
entrepreneurial type distribution. A hub firm admits members to its network based on signals 
about entrepreneurs’ types. Network membership is observable, which allows lenders to offer 
different interest rates to network and stand-alone entrepreneurs. We show that a network 
outcome can display a smaller number of high-type entrepreneurs even though the network is 
neither nepotistic nor informationally disadvantaged. While a welfare-improving network can 
emerge as a technically stable or unstable equilibrium, one that decreases welfare is always 
formed by a technically unstable equilibrium. However, the adverse welfare effects of a 
network and its corresponding type configuration may persist because ex-post high type 
entrepreneurs prefer to stay high type whereas those who wish to become high-type may need 
some time to react. 
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An informal information network, or an ￿old-boy￿club, is a group of expert agents
whose opinions on some individuals are informative. This kind of service is valuable
in particular in the labor market and business relations: it is common practice for
￿rms to solicit reference letters from job applicants, banks to consult experts and
inspect their clients￿credit records and relations. Membership or a positive reference
from networks has signal value to the extent that networks perform screening and
care about their reputations. There are countless bene￿ts of informal networks to
their members and the outside parties who interact with them. A branch in the
labor economics literature avows the advantages of networks in the hiring and job
search processes.1 There is also an entrenched literature in entrepreneurship stressing
the advantages of networks for newly established ￿rms.2 Harmful cases are mostly
con￿ned to nepotistic and/or informationally disadvantaged networks.3
This paper studies the e⁄ects of potential membership to an information network
on entrepreneurs￿e⁄orts to improve their projects (i.e., upgrade their types). In our
model, the network is meritocratic and has informational advantage over the mar-
ket, and network entrepreneurs in equilibrium are more successful on average than
stand-alone entrepreneurs, which is￿ as stated in Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998)￿ one
of the robust observations of the ￿network approach to entrepreneurship￿initiated
1See, for example, Cahuc and Fontaine (2009), Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004, 2007), Calvo-
Armengol and Zenou (2005), Fontaine (2007), Granovetter (1974), Holzer (1988), Kugler (2003),
Montgomery (1991), Mortensen and Vishwanath (1995), Munshi (2003), Rees (1966), Saloner (1985),
Simon and Warner (1992), Taylor (2000), and Wabha and Zenou (2005). See Ioannides and Loury
(2004) for a survey of the literature on the role of social networks in the labor markets.
2See, for example, Aldrich and Kim (2007), Aldrich, Rosen, and Woodward (1987), Aldrich and
Zimmer (1986), Birley (1985), Bruderl and Preisendorfer (1998), Dubini and Aldrich (1991), Inci
(2008), Parker (2008), and Uzzi (1996).
3See, for example, Lentz and Laband (1989) for favoritism in the admissions of children of
doctors to medical schools. In such cases, merit-based and/or e¢ cient allocation of individuals to
the network is not guaranteed.
2by Aldrich and Zimmer (1986). Most of the models in the entrepreneurial ￿nance
literature assume a ￿xed distribution of types and investigate various aspects of en-
trepreneurship. We endogenize the types and show that a network formation can
have striking e⁄ects on the equilibrium type con￿guration.
We consider a population of start-up entrepreneurs who are naturally endowed
with ine¢ cient projects but di⁄er in their privately known cost of upgrading their
projects (types) to e¢ cient projects. The network is a group of entrepreneurs/projects
who pass an imperfect screening mechanism performed by a large, established hub
￿rm. Initially, each entrepreneur decides on whether to upgrade his project in the
prospect of a possible network membership in the future. Given the con￿guration
of types, entrepreneurs may apply to the hub ￿rm for membership, which observes
an imperfect signal about projects and accepts them on the basis of expected value.
Entrepreneurs may reject the admission o⁄er. Agglomeration of entrepreneurs in the
network provides informational bene￿ts to lenders and thus loans are available in
a competitive market at two di⁄erent rates, one for network members and one for
outsiders. In this set-up, network membership has signaling value and opens the door
to cheaper loans but comes at the cost of transferring an ownership share to the hub
￿rm, which the hub ￿rm self ￿nances.
The more important feature of our model is that entrepreneurs￿decisions to up-
grade or not their projects before joining the network and the formation and size of
the network are interrelated. We show that a network does not form if in equilibrium
the fraction of e¢ cient projects is too small or too large. Clearly, given the imperfect
screening process, it would not be bene￿cial for the hub ￿rm to form a network if there
are too few e¢ cient projects. If, on the other hand, the fraction of e¢ cient projects is
too large, none of these entrepreneurs will join the network even though the hub ￿rm
3is willing to accept all, because lenders will infer that the network is all-inclusive and
thus price loans as if there were no network. It follows that in equilibrium a network
which e⁄ectively certi￿es projects cannot be all-inclusive; if it exists, the network
must be selective, of an intermediate size.
Typically the benchmark case without a hub ￿rm and a network has three equi-
libria. One of these is a corner equilibrium with no project upgrading. This is the
unique equilibrium for very large costs of upgrading. Otherwise, it is Pareto dom-
inated by one or two other equilibria, both of which display positive measures of
entrepreneurs who upgrade their projects. Introducing the possibility of a network
can have a negative or a positive e⁄ect. The negative e⁄ect can be a reduction in the
measure of upgraded projects in one equilibrium, or emergence of a new equilibrium
which is worse next to the bad no-upgrading-no-network equilibrium. Any positive
e⁄ect, on the other hand, comes in the form of an increase in the measure of up-
graded projects. Thus, the network may increase or decrease the equilibrium number
of e¢ cient projects and welfare.
Whenever the network increases welfare, it may do so with a technically stable or
an unstable equilibrium, but the adverse e⁄ects appear only with a technically unsta-
ble equilibrium. We note that unstable equilibria should not be dismissed outright
because project upgrade decisions are not reversible; nor do the entrepreneurs have
an incentive to downgrade once upgraded. On the other hand, those who wish to
upgrade ex post would need some time to react and build. So, when the entrepre-
neurs coordinate on a technically unstable network equilibrium that displays fewer
upgraded projects relative to its counterpart without a network, we should expect
the welfare decreasing e⁄ects to persist.
The network in our model is formed by a large, established hub ￿rm with an
4imperfect screening ability. Two words of caution are required here. First, we focus
solely on the screening function of networks. Second, whereas a network may of course
be organized by various parties with di⁄erent objectives, throughout the paper we
stick to our ￿hub ￿rm￿interpretation of network organization. Our motivation comes
from Lamoreaux et al. (2007), who provide a historical case study of entrepreneurial
networks in Cleveland, Ohio, during the Second Industrial Revolution. They report
how some established ￿rms in the region (Brush Electric Company being an impor-
tant one) acted as credible certi￿ers for networks of entrepreneurs in their search for
￿nance:
[...] Inventors who were just starting their careers needed some [...] way
to signal that their ideas were promising. Here Cleveland￿ s industrial hubs
played a critical role. Because they were collecting points for technological
expertise, they served an important vetting function. Inventors seeking
validation for their ideas gravitated to these hubs. So did business people
in search of pro￿table investments (Lamoreaux et al., 2007).
Identi￿cation and the analysis of the environments in which information networks
can grow and perform well are lively theoretical research topics. A reference paper
is Crawford and Sobel (1982), which studies equilibrium information transmission
between two parties (a single evaluator and a single user of evaluations) depending
on congruence or divergence of interest. Saloner (1985) extends their analysis to
the case of competing evaluators and studies the induced ranking of the candidates.
Besides the possibility that it becomes a nepotism mechanism and performs ￿ awed
screening, the network can also produce an externality on excluded but quali￿ed
outsiders (whose worth the market underestimates). Taylor (2000), for example,
5shows that if the network is small, members are indi⁄erent whereas outsiders are
strictly better o⁄ from abolishing the network.
Inci (2008) focuses on the internal con￿ ict of interest between quali￿ed and not-so-
quali￿ed network members and shows that the con￿ ict is con￿ned to small networks.
In small networks, not-so-quali￿ed members have a strong incentive to cripple the
information mechanism while maintaining the network￿ s unity but when the network
becomes su¢ ciently large, they can ￿disguise in the crowd￿and the con￿ ict disap-
pears. Parker (2008) analyzes the role of formal business networks in improving
welfare by serving as mediums of sharing good and bad practices. He ￿nds that
the survival of a network greatly depends on its ability to exclude free-riders from
continued membership.
From a technical point of view, our paper is closely related to Saloner (1985)
where intermediaries are in a position to provide personal opinions on the likelihood
of success of, say, personnel. Each intermediary decides whom to recommend from
a group of individuals about whom he has private information. In our setting, ac-
ceptance to the network acts as a recommendation. In Saloner, the employer makes
decisions based on his expectation about the quality of both the recommended and
unrecommended applicants, which is similar to the functioning of the lender market
in our model.
On the empirical side, our paper may be classi￿ed under the large literature that
stresses the signi￿cance and importance of ties between ￿rms and their creditors for
the availability and cost of funds (among others see Petersen and Rajan, 1994, Uzzi,
1999, and Uzzi and Lancaster, 2003). Russo and Rossi (2001) ￿nd that ￿rms in
industrial districts may have lower cost of ￿nance. Shane and Cable (2002) provide
evidence on the importance of social ties in overcoming the information asymmetry
6between entrepreneurs and their potential ￿nanciers. The evidence in Biggs and Shah
(2006) suggests that network ￿rms have easier access to credit than stand-alone ones.
Parker (2004) is a useful and extensive review of the entrepreneurship literature,
empirical and theoretical.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of costly
project upgrading and loan market equilibrium under asymmetric information. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 discusses potential equilibria respectively in the absence and presence
of a network organization. Section 5 concludes. An appendix contains the proofs and
a brief discussion of alternative objectives for network organizers.
2 The model
We consider a unit mass of risk-neutral, penniless (nonatomic) heterogeneous entre-
preneurs. Each entrepreneur is naturally endowed with a type-L, ine¢ cient, start-up
project which succeeds with probability pL and fails with probability 1 ￿ pL. How-
ever, an entrepreneur may choose to work hard to come up with a type-H, e¢ cient,
start-up project. This operation increases the probability of success to pH > pL and
costs c to the entrepreneur in terms of e⁄ort. The type of an entrepreneur is made up
of a project-e¢ ciency component (L or H) and a cost component c which we assume
is distributed uniformly over the interval [0;t].4
All projects require the same start-up cost I and yield the same return Y in case
of success, zero in case of failure. We shall denote by ￿ 2 [0;1] the measure of type-H
entrepreneurs (e¢ cient projects).5 Obviously, if an entrepreneur chooses to become a
4Our main results do not hinge on the assumption of uniform distribution of costs. Similar
equilibria arise with other smooth distributions.
5We shall use the words ￿entrepreneur￿and ￿project￿interchangeably.
7type-H entrepreneur, so does an entrepreneur with a lower cost of e⁄ort. Thus, given
￿ and the assumption of uniform distribution, we can de￿ne a critical cost level
c(￿) = t￿ (1)
such that entrepreneurs whose costs satisfy c < c(￿) become type-H entrepreneurs
and those with c > c(￿) remain type-L entrepreneurs.
The true value of a project is its expected return net of investment costs. There-
fore, denoting the risk-free interest rate in the economy by r, the true value of a
project (to a type-i entrepreneur) is
￿i = piY ￿ (1 + r)I 8i 2 fH;Lg : (2)
The e⁄ort cost c does not show up in this expression since the value of a project is
the value that is relevant to lenders when they are announcing their lending interest
rate schedule and c is already sunk and types are already determined at that moment.
Entrepreneurs, of course, take into account their e⁄ort costs in deciding on whether
to invest in an e¢ cient project. We assume the following about the values of projects
of di⁄erent types.
Assumption 1 (Values of projects) pHY ￿ t > (1 + r)I > pLY .
This assumption states that the net value of the project of the type-(H;t) entre-
preneur (the one with the highest cost of e⁄ort) is positive but that of the type-(L;0)
is negative. So, if they were to ￿nance their projects from own resources, a type-H
entrepreneur would execute his project whereas a type-L entrepreneur would not.
8A standard de Meza and Webb (1987) kind of competitive loan market funds the
start-up projects.6 Lenders do not know the types of individual entrepreneurs; they
only know the distribution of types. We assume limited liability in the sense that
lenders cannot ask for something that an entrepreneur does not have. In this envi-
ronment, funds have to be raised through standard debt contracts. The competitive
loan price clears the market. Thus, given a ￿xed and constant cost of loanable funds
(i.e., the risk-free interest rate r), all debt contracts must earn zero pro￿ts. Because
lenders cannot distinguish between borrower types, they cannot provide separating
contracts:
Lemma 1 There exists no separating equilibrium in the loan market.
The proof is in Appendix A.1. Given this result, only pooling contracts (either
fully- or semi-pooling contracts) can be o⁄ered in the loan market. It is easy to ￿nd





where ￿ is the fraction of type-H borrowers in the loan applicant pool and p(￿) is
their average success probability:
p(￿) = ￿pH + (1 ￿ ￿)pL : (4)
According to the equilibrium contract, type-H entrepreneurs cross-subsidize type-
L entrepreneurs. Type-L entrepreneurs are able to get loans with desirable terms and
6One can alternatively assume that there are at least two risk-neutral lenders in Bertrand com-
petition forming their beliefs about entrepreneurs￿types and o⁄ering loan prices simultaneously and
get the same results. See Inci (2006, 2008) for a formal derivation of the loan market equilibrium
prices under Bertrand competition.
9this is the main reason why they might be tempted to engage in start-up activities.
For example, if all entrepreneurs apply for loans, the fraction of type-H entrepreneurs
in the population at which the contracts are aimed is ￿ = ￿ and therefore the lending
interest rate is (1 + r)=p(￿). Note, for future reference, that p0(￿) > 0 and therefore
R0(￿) < 0 for any ￿ 2 [0;1].
The ￿nal actor to be described in the model is an established ￿rm which we call
the hub ￿rm. The hub ￿rm is in the process of forming its network and receives
informative but imperfect signals about entrepreneurs￿types. Each signal can take
on two values: good and bad. It is common knowledge that a type-H entrepreneur
gets a good signal with probability x whereas a type-L entrepreneur gets a good
signal with probability y < x. We assume that network membership is observable,
so lenders can identify whether an individual entrepreneur belongs to the network or
not. This allows lenders to infer the fraction of di⁄erent types of entrepreneurs both
in and outside the network in a Bayesian sense.
The sequence of events is as follows. Entrepreneurs decide on whether to stay with
the ine¢ cient project or come up with an e¢ cient project by incurring the e⁄ort cost.
The hub ￿rm receives signals about the type of each entrepreneur and then decides
whether to include the entrepreneur to its network. Entrepreneurs may turn down
the o⁄er. Having determined their projects and having made their decision to join
or not the network, entrepreneurs seek loans from lenders. Lenders observe network
membership and decide which lending interest rate to o⁄er to an entrepreneur. The
loan market clears, ￿nancial contracts are signed and investments are made. Finally,
project returns are realized and successful entrepreneurs payo⁄ their loans. An en-
trepreneur cannot reverse his project upgrade decision once that stage of the game is
over.
10In equilibrium, the competitive lending interest rate clears the loan market given
subsequent decisions of the entrepreneurs and the hub ￿rm. The hub ￿rm￿ s o⁄er
choice to each entrepreneur is optimal given its signal, and entrepreneurs￿project
decisions are individually optimal given all other actors￿decisions and the market-
clearing interest rate. Depending on the entrepreneur types who seek and obtain
loans in the loan market, equilibria can be classi￿ed as fully- or semi-pooling.
3 Equilibrium in the absence of a network
We shall ￿rst characterize the loan market equilibrium for all levels of ￿ when there
is no network organization. This analysis sets a useful benchmark. When ￿ is high,
the equilibrium contract is a fully-pooling (all-inclusive) contract in which all type-H
and type-L entrepreneurs participate. However, when ￿ is low, it is a semi-pooling
contract with participation by all type-H entrepreneurs along with a fraction of type-
L entrepreneurs.
Consider a fully-pooling loan contract ￿rst. Obviously, such a contract must
involve an interest rate acceptable to both entrepreneur types. For a type-L entre-
preneur to prefer the pooling contract, the cross-subsidy via this contract must be
large enough to produce a positive expected value for his project. In this case, the
payo⁄of a type-L entrepreneur is Y ￿R(￿)I if the project is successful and otherwise
zero by limited liability. The lending interest rate of this contract is (1 + r)=p(￿).
When cross-subsidies are small, such that the expected value of type-L entrepre-
neurs￿projects is negative, the equilibrium contract cannot be fully pooling. Nor does
a separating equilibrium exist as stated in Lemma 1. The only remaining possibility is
a semi-pooling equilibrium. In this loan market equilibrium, in addition to all type-H
11entrepreneurs, a measure of type-L entrepreneurs participate until the interest rate
is driven up su¢ ciently high so that type-L entrepreneurs make zero expected pro￿ts
whether they take a loan or not.
The lending interest rate in a semi-pooling equilibrium is (1 + r)=p(￿=[￿ + (1 ￿
￿)￿]) where ￿ denotes the measure of type-L agents who take loans and become
entrepreneurs. Note that when type-L entrepreneurs make zero expected pro￿ts, type-
H entrepreneurs also make zero expected pro￿ts (once again this argument excludes
the nonpecuniary cost of e⁄ort). Consequently, the expected value of a project for a
type-i entrepreneur is
Vi (￿) = max[0;pi (Y ￿ R(￿)I)] 8i 2 fH;Lg : (5)
The term Y ￿ R(￿)I is monotonic increasing and concave in ￿. Let ￿ ￿ be the fraction
of type-H entrepreneurs such that Y ￿R(￿ ￿)I = 0. A fully-pooling contract is o⁄ered
when ￿ > ￿ ￿ and a semi-pooling one is o⁄ered when ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿.
Turning now to the e⁄ort decisions of the entrepreneurs, ex ante, an entrepreneur
prefers working hard to come up with a type-H project as long as VH(￿)￿VL(￿) ￿ c(￿).
That is, given a fraction ￿ of type-H entrepreneurs in the economy, the expected
extra bene￿t from upgrading one￿ s project should be at least as large as its cost.
The analytically interesting equilibria are those in which a positive measure of agents
chooses to become type-H entrepreneurs. In such equilibria, the fraction of type-
H entrepreneurs satis￿es 1 > ￿ > ￿ ￿, where the cost of the marginal entrepreneur
(the agent who is indi⁄erent between becoming a type-H and remaining a type-L
entrepreneur) must satisfy
c(￿
￿) = (pH ￿ pL)[Y ￿ R(￿
￿)I] : (6)
12Here, ￿￿ denotes the equilibrium fraction of type-H entrepreneurs (equivalently,
the fraction of e¢ cient projects) in the economy. We call the LHS of this equation
the cost side and the RHS the bene￿t side. We know from (1) that c(￿) = t￿ under
the assumption of uniform distribution. The bene￿t side, on the other hand, is a
monotonic increasing function of ￿ when fully-pooling contracts are o⁄ered because
R0(￿) < 0. It is also easy to verify that this function is concave. Using the fact that the
lending interest rate in a fully-pooling equilibrium is R(￿) = (1+r)=[￿pH +(1￿￿)pL],
we ￿nd that the marginal entrepreneur, given any 1 > ￿￿ > ￿ ￿, must satisfy
t￿




￿￿pH + (1 ￿ ￿￿)pL
￿
: (7)
Proposition 1 (Interior equilibria) In the absence of a network organization, in
interior equilibria the location of the marginal entrepreneur (equivalently, the measure
of upgraded projects) ￿￿ is de￿ned by (7).
The expression in (7) is quadratic in ￿, which formally proves that there can be
at most two interior equilibria. Given the production technology and the risk-free
interest rate, the existence and number of the equilibrium types are parametrically
determined by t.
The only equilibrium in the range ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ is a corner solution. For ￿ in this range,
there are no returns from becoming a type-H entrepreneur because both types earn
zero expected pro￿ts. Consequently, the equilibrium occurs at ￿￿ = 0. It is immediate
to see that this equilibrium always exists regardless of the value of t. There may
be another corner solution at ￿￿ = 1 whenever the bene￿t of becoming a type-H
entrepreneur is at least as high as its cost at this point.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibria for a parameter con￿guration. It shows the fraction
13Figure 1: An equilibrium con￿guration when there is no network
of type-H entrepreneurs on the x-axis and the cost and bene￿t of the marginal entre-
preneur on the y-axis. When ￿ < ￿ ￿, the bene￿t from investing in quality does not vary
with ￿ and stays vertical at zero. When ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿, the marginal entrepreneur￿ s bene￿t
monotonically increases until ￿ = 1 where we obtain a ￿rst-best e¢ cient contract as
there are no type-L entrepreneurs at this right end. Intersections of the bene￿t with
the cost identify an interior equilibria where the marginal entrepreneur is indi⁄erent
between becoming type-H and remaining type-L. Such an interior equilibrium is lo-
cated at E2 in Figure 1. There are also two corner solutions in this con￿guration: E1
with no type-H entrepreneurs and E3 with no type-L entrepreneurs.
Depending on the cost parameter t, there can be other equilibrium con￿gurations.
When, for example, t = t1 as shown in Figure 2, the cost line cuts the bene￿t curve
twice. In this case, E1 remains unchanged but we have two new interior equilibria
(E0
2 and E0
3), one of which (E0
3) replaces the right-end corner equilibrium of Figure 1
14Figure 2: Other equilibrium con￿gurations when there is no network
(E3). When t is very high (as in the case in which t = t2 as shown in Figure 2), a
unique equilibrium occurs at ￿ = 0.
Some comments on the properties of equilibria are in order. Because the cost
line always cuts the bene￿t curve at ￿ = 0, existence of equilibrium is not an issue.
Whenever multiple equilibria occur, they can be Pareto-ranked: trivially, an equilib-
rium Pareto dominates another equilibrium if its ￿￿ is larger. In general, the middle-￿
equilibrium (i.e., E2 in Figure 1 and E0
2 in Figure 2) is technically unstable. In the
next section, we show that a network can emerge in both a technically stable and
an unstable equilibrium, and that the network is not socially desirable whenever it
is formed by a technically unstable equilibrium. It is therefore useful to elaborate on
the behavior of our economy around equilibria like E2 based on ￿heuristic dynamics￿
that follow perturbations to the fraction of upgraded projects, ￿.
Formation and persistence of equilibria depend on the underlying disequilibrium
15Figure 3: Disequilibrium adjustment
adjustment processes. A reasonable adjustment mechanism that acknowledges the





￿t￿1 + ￿(VH (￿t￿1) ￿ VL (￿t￿1) ￿ c(￿t￿1)) if ￿t￿1 > ￿￿
￿t￿1 if ￿t￿1 ￿ ￿￿
: (8)
where ￿t is the fraction of type-H entrepreneurs at time t and ￿(￿) is a monotonic
increasing function. According to this formulation, the fraction of type-H entrepre-
neurs at time t equals to the fraction of type-H entrepreneurs at time t ￿ 1 plus a
monotonic function of the net bene￿t of becoming a type-H entrepreneur at time
t￿1. When, for example, the economy is at a disequilibrium point with ￿t￿1 > ￿￿ as
shown in Figure 3, agents with upgrading costs between c(￿t￿1) and c(￿t) will ￿nd
it bene￿cial to upgrade their projects. Thus, we expect to see that the fraction of
upgraded projects increases by ￿t￿￿t￿1. Of course, all of those who see the immediate
16bene￿t may not be able to act immediately, which is why we have the function ￿(￿)
as a control for the speed of adjustment.
The adjustment process in (8) can be a consequence of the young generation of
entrepreneurs inheriting the projects and skills from the old. In line with the sequence
of events of the model, each generation of entrepreneurs would make their upgrade
decisions once and before their network membership and ￿nancing decisions.7 While
the adjustment process under this interpretation could be rather slow, a plausible and
relatively fast process is depicted in Figure 3, based on gradual reactions to positive
individual net bene￿ts from project upgrading. In any case, one should not expect an
instantaneous adjustment to eliminate the technically unstable, socially undesirable
equilibria because agents need time to interpret the market outcome, develop an
upgrade, and build their project.
Plausible potential causes for emergence of a disequilibrium ￿ include coordination
failures (i.e., the possibility that a small fraction of the population focuses on the
￿wrong￿equilibria located at E1 and E3 while the large majority expects E2 will be
played). It could also be a shock or a stochastic element in the project upgrading
technology. Suppose, contrary to our working assumption, that the project upgrading
e⁄ort actually succeeds with probability less than one. One can imagine that each
entrepreneur￿ s upgrading cost c is uncertain, in the form c + ￿, where c is private
knowledge and ￿ 2 [￿￿;￿] is a random variable with mean zero, unknown at the time
of the upgrading decision, and ￿ is very small. Now, the realized measure of upgraded
projects, denoted by ￿F, will diverge from ￿￿ of E2 in Figure 3.
If ￿F < ￿￿ is realized, there will exist type-H entrepreneurs who ex post ￿nd out
7We may possibly have an overlapping generations setting in which the young generation is in
the upgrading stage when the old generation is in business. In this setting, the young generation
would be a replica of the old with the additional opportunity of upgrading the project.
17that they would have done better by not upgrading their projects because the bene￿t
of upgrading a project turns out be less than its cost (i.e., VH(￿F)￿VL(￿F) < c(￿F) for
￿F < ￿￿). However, the upgrading cost is already incurred and it is still the case that
VH(￿F) ￿ 0, so these type-H entrepreneurs will remain active. More importantly, nor
will there be new project upgrades in the future because the corresponding bene￿t is
negative for all entrepreneurs who chose to remain type-L. In this case, we have a
stable measure of upgraded projects, forming a fraction ￿F < ￿￿ of all entrepreneurs.
If ￿F > ￿￿ is realized, the marginal entrepreneur will observe a positive bene￿t from
project upgrading. This invites new upgrades but, as discussed above, upgrades take
time to come into being and so the undesirable e⁄ects of the network may persist.
Eventually, the entrepreneurs located at the right of ￿F will start upgrading and ￿
will move toward its new stable equilibrium level at E3.
I pH pL r Y t
E0
2-type equilibria: + ￿ ? + ￿ +
E0
3-type equilibria: ￿ + ? ￿ + ￿
Table 1: Comparative statics on interior equilibria
We close our analysis of equilibria in the absence of a network by summarizing
the comparative static properties of interior equilibria in Table 1. An increase in
investment size, risk-free interest rate, or the highest possible cost of e⁄ort increase the
equilibrium fraction of type-H entrepreneurs for all E0
2-type equilibria whereas they
decrease that for all E0
3-type equilibria. However, an increase in the success probability
of a type-H entrepreneur or what an entrepreneur obtains in a success state decrease
the equilibrium fraction of type-H entrepreneurs for all E0
2-type equilibria whereas
they increase that for all E0
3-type equilibria.
The comparative static properties of equilibria with respect to pL are in general
ambiguous. This can be observed from (7). An increase in pL does not change the
18cost side, but it decreases (pH ￿ pL) part of the bene￿t side at the same time that
it increases the expression in the square brackets. Thus, whether the equilibrium
fraction of type-H entrepreneurs increases or decreases depends on the remaining
parameters that are linked to the macroeconomic conditions, in particular the risk-
free interest rate, and the current technology.
4 Equilibrium when there is a network
Having derived and analyzed the equilibria of the benchmark model, we are now in
a position to introduce the network into the scheme. We shall analyze the decisions
of the hub ￿rm and entrepreneurs in turn before characterizing the equilibrium when
there is a network.
As we mentioned in the Introduction, our motivation for the hub ￿rm comes from
Lamoreaux et al. (2007). In this historical case study, Brush Electric Company is
found to be one of the important hubs for entrepreneurs who are in the process of
starting their ￿rms. Three important points of this case study are relevant to our
modeling strategy. First, hub ￿rms were clearly helping network entrepreneurs in
￿nding (possibly cheaper) ￿nance from lenders. They had good relations with banks
and even organized ￿nancial institutions by themselves, which then ￿nanced some
of the network entrepreneurs. This justi￿es why being part of a hub ￿rm￿ s network
serves as a signal. Second, Lamoreaux et al. (2007) provide evidence about signi￿cant
shares held by hub ￿rms in the ￿rms started by network entrepreneurs. Holding such
shares is not only a pro￿table business for a hub ￿rm since it invests in promising
start-up projects, but it also ensures the credibility of the signals in the minds of
￿nanciers. This justi￿es why equity is used in the model and shows the background
19role of equity.8 Third, these hub ￿rms were usually established ￿rms with a history
of successful commercialization of many innovative ideas, suggesting that they are in
a better position than the market in determining the ￿types￿of entrepreneurs. This
justi￿es both why hub ￿rms have deep pockets and have informative signals.
4.1 The hub ￿rm￿ s problem
The hub ￿rm faces a simple binary choice problem: accept an entrepreneur as member
or reject. If the hub ￿rm accepts the entrepreneur, it asks for a ￿xed share ￿ 2 (0;1)
of the start-up and self ￿nances this portion. It gets the positive payo⁄ ￿￿H if the
entrepreneur turns out to be a type-H and the negative payo⁄￿￿L if the entrepreneur
turns out to be a type-L. If the hub ￿rm rejects the entrepreneur, it gets zero payo⁄.
The hub ￿rm can only observe ￿ but not the type of an individual entrepreneur.
It just gets an imperfect but informative signal of the type. According to the signal
structure explained before, the probability that a type-H entrepreneur gets a good
signal is x and the probability that a type-L entrepreneur gets a good signal is y, where
x > y. The hub ￿rm calculates its expected payo⁄s from accepting and rejecting an
entrepreneur by formulating the Bayesian inferences from the signals it receives.9
After an observation of a good signal, the posterior probability that the entrepre-
neur is type-H is
G(￿) =
x￿
x￿ + y (1 ￿ ￿)
; (9)
and after an observation of a bad signal, the posterior probability that the entrepre-
8It is worth noting that if observing the signals is costly to a hub ￿rm, it might well prefer to
not to extract them. It can rather accept members randomly or based on other things, which would
then break the credibility of its signaling. In fact, Inci (2008) shows that the signals of a hub ￿rm
are reliable if it holds a su¢ ciently large stake in the network ￿rms.
9Appendix A.3 discusses some alternative objectives of a network organizer.
20neur is type-H is
B (￿) =
(1 ￿ x)￿
(1 ￿ x)￿ + (1 ￿ y)(1 ￿ ￿)
: (10)
It is easy to show that G(￿) > B(￿) for every ￿ due to the fact that x > y.
Using (9) and (10) the expected payo⁄ from acceptance can be written as a func-
tion of the signal:
￿
J (￿) = J (￿)￿￿H + [1 ￿ J (￿)]￿￿L 8J 2 fG;Bg ; (11)
where J = G if the signal is good and J = B if the signal is bad. The hub ￿rm
is indi⁄erent between accepting an entrepreneur with a good signal to the network
and rejecting him when ￿G(￿x) = 0, where ￿x is the critical value of the fraction of





Similarly, we can de￿ne a critical ￿y for the case of a bad signal through ￿B(￿y) = 0:
￿y =
￿(1 ￿ y)￿L
(1 ￿ x)￿H ￿ (1 ￿ y)￿L
: (13)
The comparative static properties of the thresholds ￿x and ￿y are given in Table
2. An increase in investment size or risk-free interest rate increase both thresholds
while an increase in success probabilities or what an entrepreneurs obtains in the
success state decrease both of them. However, an increase in the probabilities that
an entrepreneur gets a good signal has opposite e⁄ects on the thresholds: an increase
in x decreases ￿x but increases ￿y while an increase in y increases ￿x but decreases ￿y.
21I pH pL r Y x y
￿x + ￿ ￿ + ￿ ￿ +
￿y + ￿ ￿ + ￿ + ￿
Table 2: Comparative statics on ￿x and ￿y
Since x > y, it is easy to show that ￿y > ￿x and this leads to the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 (Hub ￿rm￿ s decision) i) If ￿ < ￿x, the hub ￿rm rejects all entre-
preneurs from the network regardless of the signals; ii) If ￿y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿x, it accepts
only the entrepreneurs with good signals to the network; iii) If ￿ > ￿y, it accepts all
entrepreneurs to the network regardless of the signals.
This proposition is quite intuitive. Accepting a type-H entrepreneur is always
pro￿table whereas accepting a type-L entrepreneur produces a loss. When ￿ < ￿x so
that the proportion of type-H entrepreneurs is very small, an accepted entrepreneur
is highly likely a type-L entrepreneur no matter the signal. Then, it is better not
to o⁄er any membership. When ￿ > ￿y, the opposite happens: there are many
type-H and only a few type-L entrepreneurs, so the hub ￿rm is willing to accept
all entrepreneurs regardless of the signals. Finally, when ￿y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿x, accepting an
entrepreneur is pro￿table if he has a good signal because there are su¢ ciently many
type-H entrepreneurs among those who got good signals. However, the group with
bad signals includes too many type-L entrepreneurs, which makes it optimal for the
hub ￿rm to reject them all.
224.2 Entrepreneurs￿problem
We now focus on the project upgrading decisions by the entrepreneurs. Formation of
a network generates two groups of entrepreneurs in the economy: network entrepre-
neurs (denoted by N) and outsiders, or stand-alone entrepreneurs (denoted by S).
Denote by RN(￿) the lending interest rate to network entrepreneurs and by RS(￿)
the lending interest rate to stand-alone entrepreneurs. The payo⁄of a type-i network
entrepreneur is10





8i 2 fH;Lg : (14)
Since the signals are informative, if a network is formed in equilibrium, lenders
provide loans to network entrepreneurs with better terms. Consequently, a network
entrepreneur trades o⁄ a share of his project to the hub ￿rm for a cheaper loan as
network member. A stand-alone entrepreneur, on the other hand, owns the whole
project but, because the stand-alone population comprises a worse sample of entre-
preneurs in terms of average success probability than the network, is o⁄ered a loan
with higher interest rate. As a result, the payo⁄ of a type-i stand-alone entrepreneur
is





8i 2 fH;Lg : (15)
Particular values of RN(￿) and RS(￿) in (14) and (15) depend on the fraction of
type-H entrepreneurs in network and stand-alone populations, which in turn depend
on the type of regime which the economy is currently in according to Proposition 2.
One requirement for existence of a network in equilibrium is that the share ￿ of
10This expression, and the one below in (15), exclude the cost c(￿) of upgrading a project. It is
convenient to incorporate this cost when analyzing the entrepreneurs￿project upgrading decisions.
23the start-up that the hub ￿rm asks for is not too large. Thus, network entrepreneurs
must prefer to stay in the network (i.e., both NH(￿) > SH(￿) and NL(￿) > SL(￿)
must hold when ￿x < ￿ < ￿y). The following assumption, obtained from (14) and
(15), states a primitive condition for these inequalities to hold.





Our results hold for all ￿ satisfying this assumption, that is, as long as the ￿en-
trance share￿￿ is higher than the threshold de￿ned in this assumption. On the other
hand, a network does not form if ￿ is lower than the threshold. This is a working
assumption. We could, for example, introduce a generalized Nash Bargaining game
as a surplus sharing rule to endogenize ￿, ￿ la Harsanyi and Selten (1972). Our
speci￿cation is a shortcut to the solution of this kind of bargaining in which none
of the parties has all the bargaining power (See Kono (2006) for an application of
generalized Nash Bargaining in network formation setting).
Proposition 2 leaves three options for the hub ￿rm: accept all entrepreneurs uncon-
ditionally, accept only the entrepreneurs with good signals, or reject all entrepreneurs
unconditionally. Below we analyze the decision of an entrepreneur regarding network
membership in each of these three regimes. The following lemma is useful for this
purpose. The proof is given in Appendix A.2.
Lemma 2 (Thresholds) ￿x < ￿ ￿ < ￿y.
Consider ￿rst the case ￿ < ￿x. The hub ￿rm￿ s optimal decision is to reject an
entrepreneur no matter whether the signal is x or y. When the entrepreneur has no
chance but to become a stand-alone entrepreneur, the aggregate level implication is
24dispersion of ￿rms in the region and thus the lending interest rate is as given by the
benchmark model. However, we also know from the benchmark model that both types




, which includes the
interval [0;￿x] as stated in Lemma 2. Consequently, the lending interest rate in the
interval [0;￿x] is RS(￿) = (1 + r)=p(￿=[￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)￿]).
Second, when the fraction of type-H entrepreneurs is in the intermediate range
(i.e., ￿ 2 [￿x;￿y]), an entrepreneur is accepted to the network only if he gets a good
signal, which happens with probability x. By Assumption 2, such an entrepreneur
prefers joining the network and gets the payo⁄ NH(￿). Otherwise, with probability
1 ￿ x, he is rejected from the network, becomes a stand-alone entrepreneur and gets
the payo⁄SH(￿). Therefore, from an ex ante point of view, the expected bene￿t from
becoming a type-H entrepreneur is xNH(￿)+(1￿x)SH(￿) in the interval [￿x;￿y]. These
decisions at the micro level have aggregate implications on the industry architecture.11
All entrepreneurs who get a good signal join the network, so the probability that a
network entrepreneur is of type-H is G(￿) and the lending interest rate o⁄ered to a
network entrepreneur is RN(￿) = (1 + r)=p(G(￿)). All entrepreneurs who get a bad
signal stand alone and are o⁄ered the lending interest rate RS(￿) = (1 + r)=p(B(￿)).
The last case is ￿ > ￿y. When the fraction of type-H entrepreneurs is larger
than ￿y, the hub ￿rm is willing to accept an entrepreneur to the network no matter
whether the signal is x or y. Yet, an entrepreneur no longer ￿nds it bene￿cial to
join the network. Joining the network means giving up an ￿ share of the ￿rm in
return for better loan terms as a network member. However, this bene￿t disappears
when everyone joins the network because lenders infer that everyone is in the network
11There are x￿ type-H and y(1 ￿ ￿) type-L entrepreneurs in the network. At the same time,
there are (1￿x)￿ type-H and (1￿y)(1￿￿) type-L entrepreneurs who stand alone. This is nothing
but a partial agglomeration of ￿rms in the region.
25and thus set the lending interest rate accordingly, which would be nothing but the
lending interest rate in the absence of a network. Hence, even though the hub ￿rm
is willing to let all entrepreneurs in, none of them will do so. As a result, we observe
a complete dispersion of ￿rms. The lending interest rate is then the same as the
lending interest rate in the benchmark model, RS(￿) = (1 + r)=p(￿). The following
proposition summarizes the discussion.
Proposition 3 (Entrepreneurs￿decision) When ￿ < ￿x or ￿ > ￿y, all entrepre-
neurs stand alone. When ￿y ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿x, entrepreneurs with good signals join the
network and the rest stand alone.
This may raise the question as to whether the hub ￿rm has any preference for de-
creasing ￿ so that type-H entrepreneurs start becoming members when ￿ > ￿y. The
answer is ￿no￿simply because, for all possible ￿ values, whenever type-H entrepre-
neurs prefer to join the network, their type-L counterparts also prefer joining. Thus,
decreasing the hub ￿rm￿ s share for ￿ > ￿y does not change entrepreneurs￿decisions.
Moreover, no entrepreneur has an incentive to deviate and join the network. If one
does, from the perspective of the lenders this action has no signaling value about the
entrepreneur￿ s type. Thus, he will be o⁄ered the same interest rate regardless of his
network membership status.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 3 is the following.
Corollary 1 A network is formed only when ￿x ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿y.
264.3 The decision to upgrade a project
Having derived the hub ￿rm￿ s and entrepreneurs￿decisions, we now turn to the analy-
sis of an entrepreneur￿ s decision to upgrade his project. We can write the expected
bene￿t from becoming a type-H entrepreneur, VH(￿), as follows:
VH (￿) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if ￿ < ￿x
xNH (￿) + (1 ￿ x)SH (￿) if ￿x ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿y
SH (￿) if ￿ > ￿y
: (16)
In the same fashion, we can write the expected bene￿t from remaining a type-L
entrepreneur, VL(￿), as follows:
VL (￿) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if ￿ < ￿x
yNL (￿) + (1 ￿ y)SL (￿) if ￿x ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿y
SL (￿) if ￿ > ￿y
: (17)
From an ex ante point of view, when ￿x ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿y, an entrepreneur prefers joining the
network if VH(￿) > SH(￿) and VL(￿) > SL(￿), which are guaranteed by Assumption
2.
An entrepreneur prefers to upgrade his project if and only if doing so brings an
extra expected payo⁄:
VH (￿) ￿ c(￿) > VL (￿) : (18)
Graphical analysis of (18) can be made by modifying the ￿gures we constructed
in the benchmark model. The only modi￿cation is in the bene￿t curve for ￿ 2 [￿x;￿y],
where a network is formed. The introduction of the network increases the payo⁄ of
the marginal entrepreneur for all ￿ 2 [￿x;￿y] (i.e., the black curves in Figures 4, 5,
27and 6 replace the gray curves under them). The parts of the bene￿t curve in the
ranges [1;￿x) and [￿y;1) remain unchanged. As a result, the bene￿t curve, which is
now denoted by VH(￿) ￿ VL(￿), consists of three piecewise-continuous parts rather
than two.
We shall work out three equilibrium con￿gurations that are of interest. The ￿rst
one, shown in Figure 4, depicts the traditional view on networks: the introduction
of a network increases the equilibrium fraction of type-H entrepreneurs. The second
one, shown in Figure 5, is more interesting in that the equilibrium fraction of type-H
entrepreneurs is reduced following formation of a network. Yet, a third one is shown
in Figure 6 to facilitate the idea that a network that increases the fraction of type-H
entrepreneurs is not necessarily stable.
Figure 4: An equilibrium con￿guration when there is a network: case 1
The ￿rst equilibrium con￿guration, shown in Figure 4, replaces Figure 2 when
there is a network. As a result of the network, the gray curve is replaced by the black
28curve above it. Consequently, E1 remains unchanged, E0
2 disappears, while E0
3 is
replaced by E0
N. Notice that if a network is formed, which happens only in [￿x;￿y], it
is formed only at E0
N, which is associated with a larger equilibrium fraction of type-H
entrepreneurs than E0
3.
The intuition is the following. When we introduce the network, the (expected)
bene￿t of both type-H and type-L entrepreneurs increases while their costs stay
the same. As a result, E0
3 can no longer be an equilibrium. Then, the question is
who would be the new marginal entrepreneur who is indi⁄erent between upgrading
his project or not. At E0
3, the marginal net bene￿t from upgrading the project is
lower than the marginal net bene￿t from not upgrading it (i.e., d[VH(￿)￿c(￿)]=d￿ <
dVL(￿)=d￿). Therefore, the new marginal entrepreneur has to be to the right of the
original one and hence the new equilibrium occurs at a higher ￿. Consequently, the
network improves total welfare. This equilibrium is technically stable with respect to
perturbations on ￿.
The positive story of networks in the previous paragraphs is not universal. Figure
5, which replaces Figure 1 when there is a network, depicts another equilibrium
con￿guration. Once again, with the network the black curve replaces the gray curve
underneath. Whereas the benchmark model equilibria at E1 and E3 are una⁄ected
by the introduction of the possibility of a network, the intermediate equilibrium at
E2 is now replaced by EN, at which a network is formed.
This new network equilibrium points to a remarkable consequence: formation
of a network reduces the fraction of type-H entrepreneurs, even though the signal
mechanism of the network is neither ￿ awed nor nepotistic.12 In this setting, at E2,
12The signal mechanism is not ￿ awed as x > y and thus the hub ￿rm can better di⁄erentiate
between type-H and type-L entrepreneurs than the market. It is not nepotistic, either, since the
hub ￿rm does not base its decision on anything other than merit (in this case the type of an agent).
29Figure 5: An equilibrium con￿guration when there is a network: case 2
the marginal net bene￿t of upgrading the project is higher than the marginal net
bene￿t of not upgrading it (i.e., d[VH(￿)￿c(￿)]=d￿ > dVL(￿)=d￿), which implies that
the new marginal entrepreneur must be to the left of the original one and hence the
new equilibrium occurs at a lower ￿. Notice also that a network forms only with
EN in this con￿guration. Therefore, we conclude that introduction of a network in
an economy which displays an intermediate equilibrium like E2 in the absence of a
network will reduce welfare.
Stability properties and adjustment processes around an equilibrium like EN are
similar to those of E2, which we discussed at the end of Section 3. There are, however,
additional factors that would contribute to the persistence of an intermediate equilib-
rium like EN in the presence of a network. A trivial factor is the fact that operating
the network is a pro￿table business for the hub ￿rm. Given that the network forms
only by the technically unstable equilibrium in the con￿guration shown in Figure
305, the hub ￿rm can play the role of a coordination device around EN. Joining the
network is also bene￿cial for entrepreneurs, which will create even further incentives
to ￿x expectations on the middle equilibrium at EN in Figure 5.
Figure 6: An equilibrium con￿guration when there is a network: case 3
The third equilibrium con￿guration is shown in Figure 6. The only equilibrium
in the absence of a network occurs at E1. Here, as in the case displayed in Figure 4,
introducing the network can lead to an equilibrium with larger ￿. But unlike Figure
4, it may do so with a technically stable or unstable equilibrium, denoted by E000
N and
E00
N, respectively. We collect these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 4 (Equilibrium) Consider an information network that is neither nepo-
tistic nor informationally disadvantaged.
(i) This network may have positive or negative welfare consequences, that is, in-
crease or decrease the equilibrium number of entrepreneurs who upgrade their projects
31from ine¢ cient ones to e¢ cient ones.
(ii) A network that increases welfare can be technically stable or unstable but a
network that decreases welfare is always technically unstable.
These results beg the question: do we need any public policy to improve an equi-
librium such as EN? The answer is a cautious ￿yes,￿because technically unstable
network equilibria are unlikely to wither away once formed. If, as a result of an unex-
pected disturbance to the upgrading technology (for example, one that causes a small
fraction of failures in upgrading investments) or a coordination failure, the realized
measure of upgraded projects falls short of EN, this ￿ value will persist because, as we
argued in Section 3, upgrading costs are sunk and prospective net operation pro￿ts
are positive for all type-H entrepreneurs. When the realized measure of upgraded
projects exceeds EN, say, because a small measure of relatively large-cost entrepre-
neurs mistakenly or by a coordination failure have upgraded their projects, some
stand-alone entrepreneurs will see it to their advantage to undertake the upgrading
investment. But the adjustment to the new equilibrium can take a long time, or
even a generation. Because the welfare decreasing e⁄ects of the network may persist,
equilibria like EN are of interest and policy relevant.
It is well-known that many start-ups end up as failures within the ￿rst couple of
years of business (see Inci, 2008 and the references cited there). Indeed, de Meza and
Webb (1987), Inci (2006), and Parker (2003) showed that asymmetric information, in
and of itself, may lead to a suboptimal average quality of entrepreneurs. Our result
provides one explanation for how this high rate of failure can sometimes be ampli￿ed
by networks. Because the networks we consider here are all meritocratic and have
informational advantage over the market, the remedy to the problem depends on our
ability to distinguish networks formed by EN from those formed by E0
N in reality.
325 Concluding remarks
We studied a model in which entrepreneurs have the option of upgrading their types
and potentially join an information network, thereby get access to better terms of bor-
rowing. We identi￿ed cases in which introduction of a network improves welfare and
increases the number of high-quality entrepreneurs and cases in which the opposite
happens. The former possibility can be associated with both technically stable and
unstable equilibria whereas the latter possibility is always associated with technically
unstable equilibria.
While our model is useful in developing a conceptual framework for the analysis of
investment incentives in e¢ cient projects, it is too simple to capture all the functions
performed by networks. For example, even though our monopoly hub model includes
some features that are of interest in real life network formation cases, it fails to capture
the potential e⁄ects of competition between networks. We believe it is useful to
extend the model and allow for multiple hub ￿rms to study the e⁄ects of competition
in attracting entrepreneurs to each individual network (see, for example, Saloner,
1985 for a model of referees competing with each other). Such an extension can also
provide insights about the e⁄ect of competition on the welfare e⁄ects of networks
identi￿ed in this paper.
The Green Paper: Entrepreneurship in Europe (European Commission, 2003)
points out that business networks are becoming increasingly important and proposes
many policy suggestions for fostering and improving them. Industrial history is as rich
in cases of successful business networks as cases of networks that rose up and declined
rapidly. Future research should investigate more both in theoretical and empirical
settings the practical feasibility of the idea that policies can improve the structures
33and workings of business networks. We know, on the one hand, that the information
generated in the networks of entrepreneurs can mitigate the adverse selection problems
for their members as long as they are not nepotistic or informationally disadvantaged,
on the other hand whether they have desirable e⁄ects for the public is a question that
will continue to haunt us.
A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Assume instead that there is a separating equilibrium. The competition among lenders
implies that they make zero pro￿ts in equilibrium. Therefore, if there were separating
contracts, lenders have to make zero pro￿ts from each of these contracts. The zero-pro￿t






￿ (1 ￿ pi)BF
i = (1 + r)I 8i 2 fH;Lg ; (A-1)
where BS
i is the realized payo⁄ of an entrepreneur when he is successful and BF
i is that
when he fails. The corresponding iso-pro￿t lines are given by
piBS
i + (1 ￿ pi)BF
i = ￿ Bi 8i 2 fH;Lg ; (A-2)
where ￿ Bi is a ￿xed payo⁄ level. Note that a separating contract must satisfy all four
equations de￿ned in (A-1) and (A-2). However, in the BS ￿ BF space, the zero pro￿t
condition with type-i entrepreneurs is parallel to the iso-pro￿t line of type-i entrepreneurs.
What is more is that the slopes of the lines associated with type-H entrepreneurs is smaller
than those of type-L entrepreneurs. Therefore, given limited liability, there is no separating
contract that simultaneously satis￿es these four equations, which establishes a contradiction.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
￿ ￿ is de￿ned by pL[Y ￿ R(￿ ￿)I] = 0 where R(￿ ￿) = (1 + r)I=[￿ ￿pH + (1 ￿ ￿ ￿)pL]. Hence,
￿ ￿ =
(1 + r)I ￿ pLY
(pH ￿ pL)Y
: (A-3)
34￿x and ￿y are given by (12) and (13), respectively. Once we substitute for ￿H and ￿L in
these expressions, we get
￿x =
y [(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
x[pHY ￿ (1 + r)I] + y [(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
(A-4)
￿y =
(1 ￿ y)[(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
(1 ￿ x)[pHY ￿ (1 + r)I] + (1 ￿ y)[(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
: (A-5)
Therefore, ￿ ￿ > ￿x if
(1 + r)I ￿ pLY
(pH ￿ pL)Y
>
y [(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
x[pHY ￿ (1 + r)I] + y [(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
:
Hence,
xpHY ￿ ypLY ￿ (x ￿ y)(1 + r)I > ypHY ￿ ypLY
(x ￿ y)pHY > (x ￿ y)(1 + r)I
pHY > (1 + r)I :
This always holds by Assumption 1. Similarly, ￿ ￿ < ￿y if
(1 + r)I ￿ pLY
(pH ￿ pL)Y
<
(1 ￿ y)[(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
(1 ￿ x)[pHY ￿ (1 + r)I] + (1 ￿ y)[(1 + r)I ￿ pLY ]
:
Hence,
(1 ￿ x)pHY ￿ (1 ￿ x)(1 + r)I + (1 ￿ y)(1 + r)I < pH (1 ￿ y)Y
(x ￿ y)(1 + r)I < (x ￿ y)pHY
(1 + r)I < pHY :
Once again, this always holds by Assumption 1.
A.3 Alternative objectives of a network organizer
The network organizer in this paper is an established ￿rm but we could have other interpre-
tations. For example, the organizer can be a mutual guarantee scheme, a credit guarantee
fund (both of which are formal rather than informal), or even a group of individuals or ￿rms
(see Parker, 2004, pp. 169-171 for a discussion of such institutions in entrepreneurship).
In all of these interpretations, the organizer admits members to maximize its bene￿t, no
matter whether this is pecuniary or non-pecuniary.
Alternative interpretations may be employed with slight modi￿cations of the model.
For instance, a mutual guarantee scheme usually takes ￿xed fees and use collected funds
as collateral when a member applies for credit. The background assumption here is that
members involve in peer screening during group formation and that assortative matching
is possible, just like in micro-credit group lending schemes. In the present model, the fact
35that the hub ￿rm takes an equity share of the start-up has the same background role. In
particular, the hub ￿rm ￿nances its portion of share from its own resources, which it would
not do if it thinks that the project is not worth investing.
In our model, ex ante all entrepreneurs have the chance to become a network member
and the possibility of network membership in the future a⁄ects entrepreneurs￿ upgrade
decisions today. In the end, only some realize membership. While the network owner in our
model seeks to maximize its own pro￿ts, in practice networks may be formed by a group of
people who aim to maximize their welfare or there could be a ￿xed group that forms the
network ex ante. Below, we brie￿ y discuss and relate network types to their organizers and
expected outcomes.
1. A hub ￿rm maximizing the total welfare of network entrepreneurs.
Suppose that, given ￿, the hub ￿rm makes its decision based on expected values of the
network ￿rms rather than taking an ￿ share and self ￿nancing that portion. It turns out that
this modi￿cation leaves unchanged the critical values of the ratio of type-H entrepreneurs,
￿x and ￿y, for a good signal and a bad signal, respectively.
By making use of (9) and (10), we can ￿nd the hub ￿rm￿ s expected payo⁄ from accep-
tance as a function of the signal:
￿J (￿) = J (￿)pH
￿
Y ￿ RN (￿)I
￿
+ (1 ￿ J (￿))pL
￿
Y ￿ RN (￿)I
￿
8J 2 fG;Bg : (A-6)
Manipulating this yields
[J (￿)pH + (1 ￿ J (￿))pL]Y ￿ (1 + r)I 8J 2 fG;Bg : (A-7)
The hub ￿rm is indi⁄erent between accepting an entrepreneur with a good signal to the
network and rejecting him when ￿G(￿x) = 0. Then,
[G(￿x)pH + (1 ￿ G(￿x))pL]Y ￿ (1 + r)I = 0
￿
x￿xpH + y (1 ￿ ￿x)pL
x￿x + y (1 ￿ ￿x)
￿
Y = (1 + r)I
[x￿xpH + y (1 ￿ ￿x)pL]Y = (x￿x + y (1 ￿ ￿x))(1 + r)I
[xpHY ￿ x(1 + r)I ￿ ypLY + (1 + r)Iy]￿x = (1 + r)Iy ￿ ypLY :
Manipulating this yields
[x(pHY ￿ (1 + r)I) ￿ y (pLY + (1 + r)I)]￿x = ￿y (pLY ￿ (1 + r)I)
from which we get exactly the same condition given in (12). Similarly, we can de￿ne a
critical ￿y for the case of a bad signal through ￿B(￿y) = 0, and going through similar
algebraic manipulations above we get once again the same condition in (13). Thus, our
results remain unchanged even when the hub ￿rm is concerned about the total welfare of
its members. This is not surprising because the pro￿t share ￿ enters into equations in a
multiplicative fashion and thus the preferences of the network members and the hub ￿rm
36stay in line with each other.
2. A network is founded by a group of entrepreneurs with low costs of project upgrading.
Assume that low-cost types (i.e., those with lower c values) through some exogenous
process, are able to form a network. These entrepreneurs could be well-educated high-skilled
individuals who are acting together. Let the critical cost threshold under which the network
forms is given by n (call this the network threshold). Then, by the uniform distribution
assumption, we would have a mass n=t of network members. There are two cases to consider
here.
In the ￿rst case, the critical network threshold is lower than the critical cost threshold
under which all individuals prefer becoming type-H entrepreneurs (i.e., n < c). Now that
all network entrepreneurs are type-H entrepreneurs, they will all be o⁄ered e¢ cient lending
contracts. Among the remaining population, there will be only (c ￿ n)=t type-H entrepre-
neurs along with (t ￿ c)=t type-L entrepreneurs. If the number of type-H entrepreneurs is
su¢ ciently large in this population, these entrepreneurs will get fully-pooling contracts and
otherwise semi-pooling contracts.
In the second case, n > c and thus the network includes c=t type-H and (n￿c)=t type-L
entrepreneurs. These network entrepreneurs will be given lending contracts consistent with
their average risk. The stand-alone population, on the other hand, is composed of all type-L
entrepreneurs, which means that they will not be o⁄ered any credit since their projects are
ine¢ cient. Hence, all ￿nanced projects will belong to the network members. The crucial
point is that the network is still composed of both type-H and type-L entrepreneurs.
3. A network is founded by a group of entrepreneurs with high costs of project upgrad-
ing.
Suppose, now, that high-cost types (i.e., those with higher c values) are able to form
a network. For example, this network could be located in an underdeveloped region of the
country. Let, once again, the critical cost threshold under which the network forms be n
(call this the network threshold). We would have a mass (t ￿ n)=t of network members.
Once again, there are two cases to consider.
If the critical network threshold is lower than the critical cost threshold under which
all individuals prefer becoming type-H entrepreneurs (i.e., n < c), all stand-alone entrepre-
neurs will be type-H entrepreneurs. Given this, these entrepreneurs will be o⁄ered e¢ cient
lending contracts. On the other hand, network entrepreneurs will be composed of (c￿n)=t
type-H entrepreneurs and (t ￿ c)=t type-L entrepreneurs. If the number of type-H entre-
preneurs is su¢ ciently large in this population, these entrepreneurs will get fully-pooling
contracts and otherwise semi-pooling contracts. Note, however, given that the stand-alone
entrepreneurs are getting cheaper ￿nance, these network entrepreneurs will prefer to leave
the network.
Who leaves the network ￿rst might change the end result. If, for example, a su¢ ciently
large number of type-L entrepreneurs leave the network ￿rst, then the loan prices may get
equalized in and outside the network. In this case, we end up with a heterogenous network
37once again. If, on the other hand, type-H entrepreneurs leave the network ￿rst, then the
network will include only type-L entrepreneurs, which means that it will collapse.
In the second case, n > c and thus the network is composed of all type-L entrepre-
neurs, which means that they would not be given credit. Once again, in this case, network
entrepreneurs prefer becoming stand-alone entrepreneurs and thus we cannot have such a
network in equilibrium.
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